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Abstract
Experimental one-way decoy pulse quantum key distribution running continuously for 60 hours
is demonstrated over a fiber distance of 20km. We employ a decoy protocol which involves one
weak decoy pulse and a vacuum pulse. The obtained secret key rate is on average over 10kbps.
This is the highest rate reported using this decoy protocol over this fiber distance and duration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) involves the secure communication between two re-
mote parties, conventionally named Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver), where the security
of the keys is determined by the laws of quantum mechanics rather than the use of strong,
one-way mathematical functions to encrypt the keys [1]. Where security is of paramount
importance, QKD naturally would be the technique of choice for secret key distribution
owing to its unconditionally secure nature. Although since the original proposal [2], there
has been a considerable amount of work on QKD, beginning with the first experimental
demonstration in 1992 [3], reliable, compact systems with tolerably high enough bit rates
compatible with existing telecoms fiber technology are only now starting to emerge [4, 5].
Ideally the QKD setup should be arranged employing a true single photon source to guar-
antee immunity against the so-called pulse number splitting attacks (PNS)[6, 7] from a
potential eavesdropper (Eve). Presently there are a lack of deterministic, reliable and useful
single photon sources. Therefore most implementations rely on heavily attenuated lasers
as a photon source which emit photon pulses with a Poissonian number distribution. The
PNS attack in such a configuration would consist of blocking any true single photons in the
quantum channel, removing part of the multi-photon pulses and transmitting the remaining
portion to Bob via a lossless channel. In Eve’s best case scenario, Bob’s detection rate is
maintained while Bob is oblivious to Eve’s presence. Eve can then determine all or part of
the key [7].
A recent proposal [8] circumvents the PNS attack using additional (decoy) pulses sent by
Alice. These pulses in general have different pulses intensities compared to the signal pulses
and are interleaved randomly with the signal pulses. Bob measures the transmittances of the
quantum channel for these different pulse intensities and can then infer tighter bounds on the
final secure key by the ability to detect PNS attacks. Under such conditions Eve is powerless
to attack the channel using the PNS. Recently a proof of the decoy pulse protocol has been
displayed (GLLP)[9] which also includes realistic (if pessimistic) experimental assumptions;
Bob’s detectors can be manipulated by Eve and the detectors have finite detection efficiency.
A recent experimental bi-directional decoy pulse system has been implemented [10] but (as
pointed out by Ref. [10]) a drawback of bi-directional systems are the pulse intensities can
indeed be tampered with by Eve unknown to Alice and Bob, thus compromising security.
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FIG. 1: Schematic of the optical layout of the one-way quantum key distribution system. The
system employs BB84 phase encoding and the weak + vacuum decoy protocol. Attn: attenuator,
IM: intensity modulator, PC: polarization controller, WDM: wavelength division multiplexer, FS:
fiber stretcher. The QKD optics are driven by field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) electronics.
Fast (MHz) electronic pulse routes: solid arrows; slow (Hz) electronic pulse routes: dotted arrows.
Very recently we showed an extremely promising one-way QKD system employing a single
decoy pulse [11]. This system displayed a high key rate of over 5kbps with 25km of optical
fiber. For a non-decoy system using much quieter detectors a secure bit rate of just 43bps
was achieved over the same length of fiber [12]. This illustrates the power of the decoy pulse
method in providing a much more stringent bound on the security of the final key. Even
tighter bounds can be achieved using more than one decoy pulse [6]. Theory shows that it
is usually enough to limit the number of decoy pulses to two decoy pulses only. The optimal
case for the two decoy pulses is for one decoy of which is a lower intensity ν than the signal
pulse µ and another which has an intensity close to zero or “vacuum-like” [13]. The lower
bound on the single photon gain, QL
1
is then given by three transmittances, signal, decoy
and vacuum respectively: Qµ, Qν and Y0 [10, 13]:
QL
1
=
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
{QLν e
ν −Qνe
µ ν
2
µ2
− Y U
0
µ2 − ν2
µ2
} (1)
where QLν (Y
U
0
) are the lower (upper) bounds on the decoy pulse and vacuum transmittances
respectively , estimated conservatively as ten standard deviations of Qν (Y0) from the mea-
sured value ensuring a confidence interval of 1− 1.5× 10−23. The bit errors are assumed to
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derive from the subset of single photon pulses and the upper bound for the single photon
error rate can be written as:
ǫU
1
=
ǫµQµ
QL
1
−
Y L
0
e−µ
2QL
1
(2)
where ǫµ is the signal error rate and Y
L
0
is the lower bound on the vacuum transmittance
(estimated as as ten standard deviations of Y0 from the measured value). The lower bound
on the final secure key rate, RL can then be determined by the following expression:
R ≥ RL = qNµ{−Qµf(ǫµ)H2(ǫµ) +Q
L
1
(1−H2(ǫ
U
1
))}/t (3)
where q = 0.5 for the BB84 protocol, Nµ is the total number of signal pulses sent by Alice,
f(x) is the bi-directional error correction efficiency above the Shannon limit is estimated
to be f(ǫµ) ∼ 1.10, H2 = −xlog2(x) − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function
and the time t is the duration of the key session. The first term in eq. (3) corresponds to
error correction; the second term corresponds to the single photon gain modified by privacy
amplification (H2(ǫ
U
1
)). Although the weak + vacuum decoy protocol is predicted to have an
improved performance over the single decoy pulse protocol, recent implementations [14, 15]
show relatively low key generation rates and are limited to local synchronization.
Here we present a one-way weak + vacuum decoy pulse system which has a relatively
high secure continuous key rate of more than 10kbps over 20km of fiber length. The key
generation rate is stable over the rate time period of 60 hours and the system requires no
manual alignment for set-up or during operation.
II. QKD EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We use a one-way fiber optic QKD system with phase encoding as shown in Fig. 1.
Two Mach-Zehnder phase encoding interferometers are employed for the phase encoding
(Alice; sender) and decoding (Bob; receiver). Alice and Bob have a 20km fiber spool linking
them through which the signal (λ = 1.55µm) and clock (λ = 1.3µm) optical pulses are
transmitted. The 1.3µm clock pulse duration is 5ns with a peak intensity of ∼ 5µW;
average intensity is ∼ 200nW at Alice. The clock pulse over the entire transmission distance
does not overlap the (1.55µm) signal pulses. The signal laser is a distributed feedback type
and emits a fixed intensity train of pulses at a repetition rate of 7.143MHz. An intensity
modulator is used to produce signal and decoy pulses of differing intensities. The vacuum
4
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FIG. 2: Experimentally measured data for the 60 hours experiment. (a)Transmittances of the
signal, decoy and vacuum. (b) The quantum bit error rates of the the signal (Eµ) and the non-zero
decoy (Eν) as a function of time.
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FIG. 3: The final secure bit rate as a function of time. The extremely long term drift in the key
rate is attributed to long term day to day temperature drift in the laboratory. Inset: distribution
of the secure bit rates for the keys.
decoy pulse is produced by omitting trigger pulses to the signal laser. All signal, decoy and
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vacuum pulses are produced at random times and can have relative occurance probabilities
assigned to them. The signal and decoy pulses are attenuated strongly to the single photon
level after which a much stronger clock pulse is wavelength division multiplexed with them
to provide synchronization between Alice and Bob’s electronics. Customized electronics
based on FPGAs were developed in house to drive the QKD optics. An active stabilization
technique is employed to ensure continuously running operation. Bob’s detectors are two
single photon InGaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs) cooled to approximately −30oC and
characterized to have negligible afterpulsing [16]. . Their combined dark count rates are
∼ 1.4 × 10−4. Bob’s detector efficiency ∼ 10% and loss ∼ 2.5dB gives rise to an overall
efficiency of 5.62 × 10−2. The weak + vacuum including BB84 protocol was implemented.
Numerical simulation to maximize the secure bit rate was performed to yield the optimal
intensities of the signal and decoy pulses as µ = 0.55 and ν = 0.098. Numerical simulation
also provided the optimal probabilities of pulses: signal Nµ = 0.93, decoy pulse Nν = 0.062
and vacuum pulse N0 = 0.016. The session length for each QKD key is selected as 3 × 10
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bits which corresponds to roughly 6× 106 detection events by Bob. A total of 3262 sessions
were distributed with an average individual session time of ∼ 71 seconds.
III. RESULTS
Figure 2(a) shows the experimentally measured transmittances of the signal, decoy and
vacuum pulses. The values are stable and constant over the duration of the experiment
and agree well with the theoretically predicted transmittance (per pulse): Qµ = 0.01270±
0.00078, Qν = 0.00234 ± 0.00014 where the errors are two standard deviations; for the
vacuum transmittance (per pulse), Y0 = 1.34 ± 0.20 × 10
−4 in good agreement with the
measured dark count value of ∼ 1.4 × 10−4 measured prior to the experiment. A small
(simultaneous) proportion of fluctuations in Qµ and Qν are observed and are attributed
to polarization and/or fiber stretcher resets during which photons were temporarily not
counted. These obtained transmittances indicates the various optical states had been well
prepared and detected. The associated quantum bit error rates of both the signal (Eµ) and
the non-zero decoy (Eν) are plotted in Fig. 2(b). They are fairly stable and constant. The
final secure bit rate is displayed in Fig. 3. A secure bit rate of > 10kbps is observed. The
long term drift in the key rate is attributed to long term temperature drift from day through
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to night (the period is roughly 24 hours) in the laboratory affecting the overall temperature
of the 20km fiber spool. In a real world environment the fiber is usually located around
1 meter underground leading to very stable fiber temperatures. This would eliminate this
long term drift observed here.
The bit rate of > 10kbps is approximately more than two orders of magnitude higher
than what can be achieved at a fiber distance of 20km without decoy states [12]. Indeed,
if one were to employ more decoy states than the two we use here, there is not that much
advantage to be gained. As shown in [13] the secure bit rate as a function of fiber distance for
the single pulse and dual decoy pulse protocols varies significantly. However, the weak plus
vacuum protocol is close to the asymptotic limit of using an infinite number of decoy states.
This can be understood intuitively by the fact that the photon distribution is Poissonian and
states with a photon number N > 2 have a very small probability of occurring. Hence they
will contribute little to the overall photon distribution when the average photon numbers of
the signal and decoy states are µ,ν < 1. Additionally, there are practical problems in using
more decoy pulses such as a decrease of duty cycle of signal pulses, greater requirements on
Alices’ random number generator and more data processing power needed.
The possibility of nonlinear effects being generated in the fiber due to the clock and signal
pulses is negligible on the results of the quantum key distribution. As stated previously, both
clock and signal pulses never overlap in time throughout the entire transmission rendering
possible mixing effects negligible. Addtionally, any (small) Raman scattering generated by
the clock pluse in the fiber was adequately filtered out using an efficient wavelength division
multiplexer at Bob. In any case, if the Raman scattering was a problem, the quantum bit
error rate would be higher than observed. Finally, the experimentally observed quantum
transmittances agrees very well with the predicted transmittances indicating the system
performs with the expected losses accurately.
To assess the possibility of a PNS attack on the key distribution, the technique used
previously [11] was to monitor the ratio of transmittances Qν/Qµ. If Eve decides to im-
plement a PNS attack, the ratio Qν/Qµ will dip below the expected value as preferentially
more multi-photon signals would be transmitted to Bob (the transmittance Qµ > Qν due to
µ > ν). This is displayed in Fig. 4(a)(ii). No secure bit rate is possible with Qν/Qµ < 0.13.
Now with an additional vacuum pulse at our disposal we can also check for Eve’s ma-
nipulation of the vacuum rates. In keeping with the paranoid assumptions of GLLP [9], we
7
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FIG. 4: (a)(i) Frequency count distribution of the quantum transmittance ratio Qν/Qµ. (ii) The
secure bit rate simulated as a function of Qν/Qµ (solid line); experimentally measured data (red
crosses). (b)(i) Frequency count distribution of the vacuum count probability Y0. (ii) The secure
bit rate as a function of Y0 (solid black line); experimentally measured data (red crosses). Also
shown for comparison is the single decoy protocol secure bit rate (dotted line). The dotted lines
in both Figs. show the expected values in the absence of PNS attacks, artifacts and manipulations
of the vacuum count rates.
assume Eve can either reduce or increase the vacuum rates. Depicted in Fig. 4(b)(ii) is the
simulated effect of changing Y0 on the secure bit rate. For the weak plus vacuum protocol
implemented here no secure bit rate is possible for Y0 > 10
−3 (solid black line). However, if
one were to use a single (non-vacuum) decoy protocol (dotted blue line) no secure bit rate
would be possible for Y0 > 4.8× 10
−4. This shows the power of using more than one decoy
pulse. Further insight can be gained by examining the formulae for the weak plus vacuum
protocol (eq.(1) & eq.(2)). The magnitudes of the single photon gain (privacy amplifica-
tion) are greater (smaller) respectively by using the weak + vacuum protocol compared to
employing the single pulse protocol. This is manifest through a tighter bound on the single
photon gain eq. (1) and the single photon error rate eq. (2). The second term in eq. (2)
reduces the overall single photon error rate due to the measurement of the vacuum pulses.
In the single decoy pulse protocol this term is zero.
Finally we address the issue of the small number of spikes observed in the vacuum counts
transmittance (Fig. 2(a)). All classical messages are exchanged on the internet. We believe
the spiking is due to increased internet traffic slowing down classical exchange of information
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between Alice and Bob and thereby affecting synchronization. It affected less than 1% of the
entire set of quantum keys exchanged over the 60 hour period. For large numbers of counts
(the signal and decoy pulses) this effect is negligible, but for low numbers of counts (Y0) this
effect can be apparent. We are currently working to improve this problem with modifications
to the software. However, we note this behaviour does not compromise security as evident
from Fig. 4(b)(ii). As can be seen, an increase in Y0 overestimates the amount of privacy
amplification and results in a shorter key, hence lower final secure key rate. The final secure
key rate is underestimated for this small fraction of keys.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have demonstrated practical one-way decoy pulse QKD over 20km of
optical fiber. The key generation rate is > 10 kbps on average over 60 hours. This is the
highest reported key rate for this distance and duration. We believe the system to be a
useful milestone in achieving a continuously operating QKD system. It is envisaged that
such a system could be placed in a real-world environment such as a quantum nodal network
with fiber links of around a few tens of kilometers of fiber. Such a system would be reliable
and effective as a means of distributing quantum keys over a long period of time.
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